Sexual Violence Against Women as a Symbol of Identity Formation Among the Fur People of Darfur, Sudan

The Fur have a long history of cooperating with other groups in the region to form both states and insurrections. Recent history, however, has relegated them to obscurity, thus causing the Fur people, alongside other people of the region, to assert their identities. Now, the joint forces of the Khartoum government troops and the Janjiweed, an Arab militia, are systematically destroying these identities. This paper will explore how sexual violence against women has contributed both to the construction of an identity and to the destruction of this same society and identity. It will also look at why violence against women is such a strong symbol for the Fur, and why it is a crucial part of society as a whole, rather than just women. To construct identity, the Fur created a new “tradition”, in an attempt to return to older African roots, which had been buried somewhat by the introduction of Islam into society. This “tradition” was Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). On the other hand, the militias and troops in Darfur are using rape to destroy society, and to bring the Fur people to their knees. Thus this violence is physical; because it can cause irreparable damage to women, structural; because of a history of impunity for the rapists and mutilators, and symbolic; because it unifies the Darfurians under a cohesive identity.
In Sudan, and more specifically Darfur, the majority of women are “circumcised”. Female Genital Mutilation is very severe in Darfur, as most people are Pharonically circumcised, or infibulated. This involves the excision of the clitoris and all of the labia minor and labia majora to leave a smooth vulva and a small opening for urine and menstrual fluids (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 93). Typically, infibulations leaves a hole approximately the size of a matchstick (Williams 967). Ninety percent of women are circumcised in Darfur (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 93). Because of poor hygienic conditions, FGM can result in infection, shock, hemorrhaging, abscesses, benign nerve tumors, cysts, scars, and sterility. Also, because FGM is performed as a rite of passage, many times the same utensils are used for different girls, which can spread HIV and other diseases (Amnesty International 1). The girl’s genitals are then sown up with cat or lamb intestines, and the legs are tied together for anywhere from two weeks to two months, rendering them immobile (Amnesty International 1). This practice is called tahur in Arabic, which means purity or cleanliness (Williams 968). In Darfur this is primarily done to girls between the ages of five and ten. Other similar practices that harm women, but are integral pieces of society are allowing men to beat their wives as well as rape them. These practices have physical, sexual, and mental ramifications for the individuals subjected to it.
While the most severe forms of “circumcision” have been banned in Sudan since 1946, it has become a critical party of the family, and thus as an extension of kinship, the entire socio-cultural system (Williams 967). Mostly the practice is used to initiate women into adulthood, to enhance femininity, to maintain purity and virginity, to preserve family honour, to repress sexuality in women, and to increase a woman’s marriageability (Williams 968). The United Children’s Fund describes FGM as “A traditional practice believed to enhance a girl’s beauty, honour, marriageablility, status and chastity. Parents encourage cutting so the family honour and their interests are protected,” (UNHCR 1). It is also believed that FGM will mitigate a woman’s desire for sexual intercourse, thus keeping them faithful to their husbands, and ultimately the role prescribed by society for women (Amnesty International 2). Women who are not circumcised are often ostracized by the community (Amnesty International 2). Although religious leaders initially supported the practice, it is now thought to be “unIslamic” by those attempting to return to the traditions of the religion, which contains no mention of Female circumcision (Williams 969). Another complication with FGM is that the women themselves are typically the ones executing the practice. This means that the women who are trained as midwives to help victims of rape and to help childbirth, particularly in refugee camps, are also the ones responsible for performing the mutilation surgeries (UNHCR 2-3).
According to de Waal, FGM only spread in the 70s and 80s in Darfur just as the Khartoum elites were rejecting it. It was an attempt to return back to “African traditions” in order to assert their hybrid identity, as Darfurians were looked down on by the Arab North as not truly Muslim. This was part of a larger identity change in Darfur (de Waal 196). Part of ‘becoming Sudanese’ was to change the status of women to a more demeaning role. The ideal Darfurian woman can now be described as, “circumcised, secluded at home, economically dependent on her husband, meek in behavior, and dressed in the thoub,” (de Waal 196). The assertion that FGM is a “deeply traditional, pre-Islamic custom” (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 93) is common, but inherently false, as it is a more recent development in Darfur, one that severely limited the role of women in society. In a way the psychological effects of FGM can be seen across society, indicating a larger trend and a larger symbol for a society plagued by violence against women that has become integrated with every day life in Darfur. This effect can be seen in studies conducted on men in Sudan, which state that most men are unaware of the negative effects that FGM has on women, and are instead fearful of the difficulty for them to have sexual intercourse with their wives, thus they prefer an uncircumcised wife, but would circumcise their daughters. This is referred to as Cultural Inhibition Syndrome, which is a cycle of close-mindedness that denies any positive change (Magied and Musa 3).
In Darfur, according to van Zeijl, “sexual violence against women is occurring on a massive scale in Darfur.” Amnesty International has characterized mass rapes as a weapon of war, as it fits into a larger pattern including Cambodia, Liberia, Peru, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda (van Zeijl 1). Rwanda’s Criminial Court, which has been hearing cases since the 1994 genocide, has labeled systematic rape as an act of genocide, meant to;
“... destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II (The Lancet 1). Many times in Darfur, women are raped while executing daily tasks, such as gathering wood outside of the refugee camps. Contrary to logic, women are not entirely safe after they have fled the actual Darfur region into Chad. Many Janjaweed enter the territory and continue to rape women. The United States State Department says that twenty percent of refugees have witnessed rape, but because it is a cultural taboo, the number is probably higher (Wagner 4). Even inside the camps aid workers have to deal with systematic violence against women, both external and internal, such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and FGM, all remnants of previous societal norms. Women who have been raped during attacks in their former villages have reported other crimes such as being beaten with whips, having legs broken so it is difficult to escape, being immobilized with rope, being “marked” with whips and knives, and being taken as sex slaves (Wagner 5). While this is clearly devastating both the women subjected to the rape and the society on a whole, Khartoum is displeased with foreigners seeing the violence in Dafur, especially with the aim to help abused women. They have described these reports as concoctions, and have threatened and arrested aid workers and journalists for reports on the topic (van Zeijl 2).
In order to understand why rape has been a strong symbol for the destruction of identity and society, one must understand the interaction of women and society. In Darfur, women who have been raped are ostracized and devalued as future brides. Van Zeijl put the relationship of rape and society into context by saying, “Rape, used as a weapon of war, can be construed as a gruesome enlargement of societies’ unequal attitude toward women in peacetime.” (van Zeijl 2). Because rape is taboo in Sudan, many girls are afraid of what parents might say, as it is many times considered the woman’s fault if she is raped. A second level to this issue is problems with the rapes causing pregnancy. The first issue with this is that many women want abortions, but cannot have them because it is only legal if it is necessary to save the woman’s life. Secondly, the woman and her child are ostracized by society because there is a prevalent myth in Sudan which states that women cannot get pregnant from rape, and thus the women may be imprisoned for adultery. According to a man in the refugee camps, “we believe that nobody can become pregnant when raped, because this is unwanted sex and you cannot have a child from unwanted sex.” (Wagner 7). This in turn can cause such psychological stress that many women have committed suicide to escape their post-rape social condition (Wagner 7). What this boils down into in the context of war is that, “In Darfur, the Arab militia and military make a point of abusing women in front of their families or entire village. Raping a woman is such an effective weapon because it affects an entire community, for decades.” (van Zeijl 1). The Janjaweed often rape women in public places, such as market squares, so to destroy not only their lives, but the lives of those who observe the crime. “French anthropologist Veronique Nahoum-Grappe calls it ‘destroying the future’. Children who witness the crime are traumatized, men flee from their partners out of shame, and women become ‘damaged goods’, sometimes literally, if they can no longer have children because of the violence,” states van Zeijl, who reiterates the role rape can play on society as a whole (van Zeijl 1-2). As she states, “a raped woman isn’t worth much in Darfur” (van Zeijl 2).
Where this practice becomes genocidal is that it is often done with the express intention of impregnating the rape victim to propagate the Arab race and to weaken traditional African lines. The intention is to populate the region with Arabs, and to hinder certain people from repopulating (Wagner 4). According to Wagner, “Independent investigations of these crimes routinely turn up evidence of mass rapes, which often have the intent to impregnate.” (Wagner 1). This sort of ethnic cleansing, having the enemy’s babies, has much greater effects on the victims psychological effect because they are often told that these are the intentions of the perpetrators (van Zeijl 2). According to one woman, Sawela Suliman, a 22 year old rape victim from West Darfur, “They grabbed my donkey and my straw and said, ‘Black girl, you are too dark. You are like a dog. We want to make a light baby… They said, ‘you get out of this area and leave the child when it is made,” (Wagner 1). Taking the level of ethnic cleansing farther, one pregnant woman had her stomach sliced open as her attacker declared that her child was the child of the enemy. (Wagner 4-5).
Sexual violence against women in Darfur is not just prevalent; it is a symbol of identity. Throughout the identity construction and destruction in Darfur, the role of women has been crucial to indicate the strength of society. Because violence was so critical for maintaining the social order of subjugating women, the Janjaweed and the government troops have used it as a symbolic way to turn society into chaos, on physical, structural, and symbolic levels. By destroying a sector of society that is closely entwined with the health of the society, the attackers have been able to affect the psychological and physical condition of the all facets of society.
_____________________________________
Amnesty International USA
2007 Female Genital Mutilation: A Fact Sheet. Accessed November 16th, 2007. .
de Waal, Alexander
2005 Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement. African Affairs 104 (415): 181-205.
Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban
2002 Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Magied, Ahmed Abdel and Musa, Suad.
2004. “Psycho-sexual effect of female genital mutilation on Sudanese men.” Ahfad Journal. 21.1. June 2004. P18-29.
"Sudan and its new weapons of war. " The Lancet. 364.9432 (July 31, 2004): 390. Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 14 Nov. 2007
.
United Nations High Commission on Refugees.
2007. “Chad/Darfur Emergency”. Accessed November 16th, 2007. .
van Zeijl, Femke. "War against women: many thousands of women have been raped in Darfur--yet they are the ones who end up being punished. Femke van Zeijl listens to their stories.(VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN). ." New Internationalist. 401 (June 2007): 10(3). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 14 Nov. 2007
.
Wagner, Justin. "The systematic use of rape as a tool of war in Darfur: a blueprint for international war crimes prosecutions. " Georgetown Journal of International Law. 37.1 (Fall 2005): 193(51). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 14 Nov. 2007
.
Williams, Lindy; Sobieszczyk.
1997. “Atttitudes Surrounding the Continuation of Female Circumcision in the Sudan: Passing he Tradition to the Next Generation.” Journal of Marriage and Family. Vol. 59, No. 4.: pp. 966-981.

Fur: Part 2: History

Darfur has long been a region of dichotomies united into one region. The population is divided into two main ethnic groups, the Arabs and the Africans and the Sultanate combined traditional sacred traditions of African kings and Arab-Islamic legitimacy. Although these dichotomies have historically been of little importance to the maintenance of the region, recently they have been a primary factor in the genocide of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaliet people of the Darfur region. Due to their prominence in history, this paper will examine the role of the Fur in defining the history of Sudan. Their history begins with the Fur Sultanate, then Turco-Egyptian rule, Mahdist rule, return to a Sultanate, British rule, independence, President al-Bashir, and the modern genocide. It is important to consider these events in the context of the dichotomies that defined the growth and decline of the Darfur region.
The Fur people were initially a relatively obscure mountainous people who took control of the region in the late 16th century to the early 17th century after the Tunjur rule. (Prunier 8). The proto-Fur people came down from the mountains and overran the plains, using Islamization to control the populations. Previous to the Sultanate, the Fur did not exist as a united people, but several groups that were united as they took control of the region. Among these were the Daju and Tunjur people (Prunier 8). This provided them a distinct advantage, as they were able to use the system of Muslim clerics to effectively administrate the region. They were capable of writing, which provided the Sultanate with a means of keeping order and power through records and trade. According to Prunier, the movement towards Islam “put Darfur on the map of ‘civilized’ Muslim Africa,” (Prunier 8-9). The Kiera Sultanate began in 1580 with the “legendary figure of a ‘wise stranger’, Ahmad al-Ma’qur,” ((Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 151). The first known sultan, Sulayman Solong (pale man) (Prunier 8), came from a branch of the Fur people know as the Kunjara (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 104). He reigned from the early 1600s until 1640. He was the son of a Fur father and an ethnic Arab mother, which represents the initial peaceful dichotomy of the region from an early stage.
The sultanate was set up in an interesting manner, as it combined African sacred monarchial traditions with Islamic rules and traditions. These two sets of traditions created a hybrid state that clearly marks the transition from northern, predominantly Arab Africa with the Sub-Saharan cultures. The Sultans practiced “aadinga”, or succession rites, which clearly defined who and how an individual would ascend to the throne. The palace, or fashir (an Arabic word) was laid out in accordance with cosmological symbolism, which was a belief outside of Islamic tradition (Prunier 12). Another tradition that varied from standard Islamic practice was the important role that women played in ruling the country. The “habooba”, or grandmother, who was actually the Sultans mother, was often the power behind the throne. Her main competition was the “iiya baasi”, or the favorite sister of the Sultan, who would also wield large amounts of power. One example is Zamzam Umm an-Nasr, who ruled instead of her weak brother who went blind in 1856. She led the army and the political arena. Her brother soon passed away, and she starved herself to death. According to Prunier, “women could be freer than in the Islamic social order, but they still had to obey the pagan cosmological order which underpinned their freedom” (Prunier 12). Irony can also be found in a description of Sultan Muhammad Tayrab (r. 1752-1785), who was described as “ruler of the Arabs and the barbarians” (one should note that barbarians means those who do not speak Arabic in this case). He was an African Sultan embodying Arabism and Islamic rule (Prunier 10-11).
Darfur was essentially a feudalistic state (Prunier 11). The Sultans had the right to grand hawakir, or large estates, and hawakir al-jan, or estates with honor that paid no taxes. These estates were inturn ruled by Cimakura, or big lords, who would have several Cima gara, or junior lords who owed them taxes and military service (Prunier 12-13). The army was comprised of Fursan calvary equipped with cotton quilt garb and chain mail armor. They used double-edged soligen blades. This tradition of excellence in the Fur calvary was unchallenged until the invention of guns, when Sultan Ibrahim Manawashi was killed on October 3rd, 1874 by a “bazinger”, or a slave infantryman, of Zubeyr Rahman Mansurs army using a rifle. Zubeyr Rahman was a Fur trader who found success in the south and later returned to take over the Kiera Sultanate and begin their decline as a political power (Prunier 13). The Fur Sultans were, however, capable of avoiding the dangers of feudalism as their administrative positions, sharati and maqdim, were not inherited.
The Fur were very militant rulers. All those who were conquered became assimilated into the Fur people and were forced to abandon their tribal status. The political and economic domination of the Kiera rule was soon followed by linguistic and religious domination. If people did not capitulate to their demands then the Fur would use military strength to displace them to the south and become “Ferit”, which is still used as a derogatory name in Darfur today. Non –Islamic people were given the opportunity to convert, or had to immediately leave (Prunier 9).
The Keira Sultanate also occupied itself with expansion and trade. In the 17th and early 18th centuries the groups continuously feuded with the Wadai, a neighboring power. This feud would last for the entirety of the Kiera rule. Under Sultan Muhammad Tayrab in the late 1780s, Kordofan, a crucial province in trade networking was annexed. The Kierans ruled this area until it was taken in 1821 by the Turco-Egyptians. Kordofan provided the link to the end of the Forty Days Road, known in Arabic as Darb al-Arba’in. The Sultans used it to transport slaves, ivory, tamarind, and ostrich feathers to Egypt in return for horses, saddles, weapons, and armor (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 101) as well as gold, silk and manufactured goods (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 104). At this point the capital moved from Al-Fashir to Kobbei in order to be in a more advantageous to ruling both Darfur (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 160).
Islam played a large role in legitimizing the rule of the Fur Sultanates, as they were able to establish a worldwide Islamic community, the Umma. It gave the sultans a “broader cultural context” in which to thrive as a political and economic power as well as a religious one (Prunier 9). The Fur sultans built mosques and supported teachers in order to educate their people. The Sultanate sent so many people to al-Azhar University in Cairo that there was an entire cloister for the Darfurian students (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 105). The first large scale religious conversion occurred under the reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682-1722), although Sulayman Solong established Islam as the official religion of Darfur (Metz 13).
In 1874 Zubayr Rahma Mansur, a slave- trade mogul, conquered Darfur. He began the downfall of the Darfur region (Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban 75). The Turco-Egyptian Empire, however, had already conquered Kordofan, in August of 1821 with the help of Napoleon. The Turco-Egyptian Empire then began to send raiders into Darfur to capture slaves and elephant in very brutal method (Prunier 16). After Mansur ruled for a short period of time in 1874, Darfur also was taken by Turco-Egyptian forces, and this became known as the Umm Kwakiyya, or times of trouble.
Darfur was conquered again in 1881 by a man proclaiming to be the prophet who comes just previous to the end of the world. He called himself Mahdi. The Mahdists never really had a strong hold in controlling Darfur, and the Mahdi dies five months later, which additionally cripples the regime. A weaker ruler, Khalifa Abdullah, then takes the reigns. This begins the trend towards foreign rule over Darfur, which will always be extremely problematic.
In 1899 the Egyptians came under British rule and were forced to recognize Ali Dinar, a grandson of a former Keira Sultan, as a re-established Sultan (“Darfur: a history” 1). Britain, although capable of taking over Darfur, were split on the decision. Sir Reginald Wingate, first Governor General of Sudan wanted to reoccupy Darfur but Lord Cromer opposed it because he believed it held no economic value (Prunier 20). The British government did hold on to some control by demanding symbolic payments. Ali Dinar has a somewhat secular reign marked by a decrease in the importance of Islam. In May of 1916 Ali Dinar is defeated by the British near al-Fashir. He then flees to the Jebel Marra where he is hunted down and killed by the British on November 6th, 1916 (Prunier 21).
Britain strived solely to protect the peace of the region, and thus did not interest itself with the economy of Darfur. Thus they made no investments in the region, and by 1935 Darfur had only four schools, no major road or railway systems outside of big cities, and very limited health care. This sets a trend for how the area will be treated by successive leaders. Sudan was granted independence in 1956. As they were more interested in the North-South conflict, they assigned power to an elite group of Northern Arabs. This caused a North-South civil war that lasted from 1955-1972. Darfur during this period was extremely conflict ridden. According to the New Internationalist, “The use of Darfur by Libya’s Colonel Qadafhi as a military base for his Islamist wars in Chad promoted Arab supremacism, inflamed tensions, flooded the region with weaponry and sparked the Arab-Fur war (1987-1989), in which thousands were killed and hundreds of Fur villages burned,” (“Darfur: a history” 2). Darfur was also hit hard by a famine in the 1980s.
In 1989, Omar al-Bashir seized power for the National Islamic Front. He destroyed the framework of the government and declared jihad on the non-Muslim South. In 2005 a peace treaty was reached with Southern Sudan, but it neglected the new issues with the Darfur region. The Darfurians took measures similar to the Southern Sudanese in rebelling from the government, and in 2003 the government began to retaliate brutally to the rebels, namely the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The government employed an Arab militia to do most of their dirty work. The Janjaweed, or “devils on horseback” have been present in Darfur since the late 80s, but they were only employed for the government’s genocide in 1996. This strategy allowed the government to limit their resources in Darfur while still maintaining power and punishing its people for the simple crime of being in the way of absolute power. Thus the dichotomy that once served to shape Darfur in its prime turns out to be a factor in its current condition (“Darfur: a history” 2).
________________________________________________
Bibliography
"Darfur: a history. " New Internationalist. 401 (June 2007): 16(2). General OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 25 Oct. 2007
.
Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban
2002 Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Metz, Helen, ed.
1992 Sudan: A Country Study. Washington: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.
Prunier, Gerard
2007 Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fur: Part 1: The Fur People of The Jebel Marra Mountain Range in Darfur, Sudan: Environment

The Fur people inhabit the Jebel Marra Mountains in central Darfur, a region marked by sandy soils and harsh conditions. The development of the Fur people is thus linked closely with the environment they inhabit. It is important to examine how the environment affected the development of society, politics, and economics during the reign of the Fur Sultanates and British rule, and also why conflict arose in the region after colonial rule was ceded to the Khartoum government in 1956 (Adam Mohamed 2006:69). Initially it is imperative to examine the environment itself, then its implications in regards to the Fur people.
Darfur covers an area the size of France (de Waal 1989:33). It is approximately 191,650 square miles (Lobban and Fleuhr-Lobban 2002:75). Darfur is landlocked and isolated by a lack of adequate roads or railways. It is remote, and travel from the south is discouraged because of the presence of malaria and tsetse flies, which cause African sleeping sickness (Prunier 2007: 2). The environment of the Jebel Marra region is semi-fertile, with a sandy soil mix called qoz, which covers sixty five percent of the north and ten to fifteen percent of the south (Fadul 2006:34). Agriculture is the practiced here, but with low yields (Prunier 2007: 3), as rainfall ranges from 200 to 400 mm. of rainfall yearly (Fadul 2006:34). The rainy season is April to December, and is brought by southwestern winds, however, if the rain is delayed, famine will ensue (Metz 1992:66). Water is a very limited resource in Darfur. People must congregate around wells in order to survive, as there are no perennial streams. Wells often dry up during the dry season (Metz 1992:61), which is January to March (Metz 1992:66).
This has affected the development of language and kinship ties in Fur society. The influx of Arabic speaking people into the region led to the introduction of the Arabic language into the region. The African agriculturalists speak both Arabic, which is advantageous as a written language, as well as their native language, which is derived from the Nilo-Saharan family (Lobban and Fleuhr-Lobban 2002:75). Kinship ties are also typical of the agriculturalist sector, in that they are patrilineal, as the identity of a family is inherited through the male line (de Waal 2005:185).
One result of the influx of Arab nomads to the region in the past has been a level of social fluidity between the Baqqara, or cattle herders, and the Zurga, non-Arab cultivators (Haaland 1982: 65). The result is a civilization where the ethnic distinctions have disintegrated into more political alliances rather that distinct African and Arab tribes. As O’Fahey states, “a successful Fur farmer would invest in cattle; once the cattle reached a certain number, it would be more profitable to cross the ethnic frontier and ‘become’ Baqqara and in a few generations his descendants would have and ‘authentically’ Arab genealogy,” (2006:24). The fluidity extends both ways as de Waal states, “to the south were more independent groups, some of which ‘became Fur’ by becoming absorbed into the Fur polity” (de Waal 2005:184).
The effect of the environment on politics in Darfur is clearest through land tenure. Initially land was split according to tribe, each of which received a Dar (a large piece of land) that was controlled by the chief. The chief was responsible for dividing the land among every member for cultivation as well as allotting leftover land for visiting pastoralists (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:58). This provided for four levels of land ownership, the first being the tribal dar, the second, known clan boundaries, the third, village level with individual owners controlling a portion, and finally unclaimed land available for nomads, as designated by village heads (Yagoub Mohamed 2006: 59-60). There are other aspects to land tenure as well, which specify what is communal and what is private. For example deadwood for fuel, underlying grass, and freestanding water are all communally owned, while dug wells and hashab tree (gum arabic) stands are privately owned (Metz 1992:146). Eventually, the Fur sultans introduce the idea of hakura, or large estates recorded on written documents called wathiqa al-tamilk. They granted these estates to high-ranking officials and army commanders. This is an example of patron-client relations, as they were used in political bargaining and winning the favor of influential men (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:59).
Degradation of this land tenure system began in 1970, when the national government abandoned it for a more rigid system administered by the state (Huggins 2004:4). This was done through the Unregistered Land Act of 1970, which stated that all unregistered land belonged to the government. Since little of the land was legally documented, this meant that much of it went to the government. This resulted in three different types of land tenure, the first being government lands with community rights, the second being government lands with no community rights, and the third being hawakir (harakur designated by the Fur Sultanates) and leased land (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:59). In this current system the only way to control land is to constantly use it by establishing crop rotations between crops and hashab trees, which renew the soil. Much land has come under contestation with this act, as nomads compete with sedentary farmers for government land (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:61).
Land tenure and environment also affect the economic success of the farmers. The qoz soil limits what can be grown in the Jebel Marra. The Fur cultivate dukhn (bulrush millet), dhurra (common millet), groundnuts, maize, sesame, onions (O’Fahey and Spaulding 1974:7), fruits, tobacco (Lobban and Fleuhr-Lobban 2002:75), gum arabic, peanuts (Metz 1992:64), okra, and tomatoes (Prunier 2007:3). The seeds are sown in June and July, and are harvested in November and December (O’Fahey and Spaulding 1974:7). Millet is the staple food for seventy-five percent of the population, which has encouraged farming to increase greatly in the past forty years. By 1960, millet production was up 125 to 150 percent (Fadul 2006:7).
The economy under the Fur Sultans prospered as they controlled the southern part of the trans-Saharan Forty Days Road (Lobban and Fleuhr-Lobban 2002:104). The Forty Days Road or the darb al-arbain, extends into Egypt, and provided for the advancement of trade and culture during the Sultanate period in Darfur history (Prunier 2007:2). The effect of the absence of this pre-colonial trade has certainly contributed to the poor conditions in Darfur today (Prunier 2007:4).
One fundamental reason for the current conflict in Darfur is the environment. According to de Waal, “ethnic cleansing in Darfur is as much about political hierarchy as about occupation of land,” (2005:199). This includes land shortages, decreased soils, drought, overgrazing, increased ownership of small livestock by sedentary farmers, arguments over water, desertification, and more demand for food (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:60). These intense conditions, exacerbated by poor governance, led to conflict in the region. In the mid 80s, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi armed the Baqqara so that they could defend themselves against the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Instead they turned these guns on the Fur people in the Jebel Marra (O’Fahey 2006:26). The 1980s also saw the realignment of the Arabs considering themselves Islamic, and considering the Africans not. Thus the Fur aligned themselves with Habre, the President of Chad. In turn, this caused the Baqqara to attempt to carve home territories from leased Fur land. Now the Baqqara are targeting the Fur livelihoods, such as orchards, farms, fields, and villages (Johnson 2003:140).
Many years ago, these issues were minimal because there was much less competition for land (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:58). The Arab cattle farmers are competing now with the sedentary Fur agriculturalists for the limited land in the Darfur region. Recently available land has diminished as farm size increases (Yagoub Mohamed 2006:60). The decrease has also been apparent in the disintegration of sixty percent of the qoz soils, which produce pasturelands for the Baqqara, as well as farmland for the Fur (Fadul 2006:38).
Drought has been a key factor in the conflict, as it forced migration of the Baqqara in the mid 70s to early 80s. This caused the cattle herders to enter the central farming belt simultaneously with the expansion of Fur farming in order to trade to the internal markets of Urban Sudan (Johnson 2003:139). Another drought in the mid 80s led to more rapid desertification, which led to again more pressure on water and grazing sources. In general, rainfall has decreased greatly over the last thirty years, which has let the ninety ethnic groups of the region to forty ‘inter-tribal’ wars in twenty years between farmers and pastoralists. These have occurred in a retaliatory fashion of cattle raids and village attacks (Huggins 2004:1-2).
By 1984-1985 Darfur was already overgrazed. (Johnson and Anderson 1988:147). With the resources of 1982, 150,000 livestock units should be maintained, but over 500,000 were actually maintained. (Haaland 1982:57). Recently increased pressures on land have led the Fur to gravitate toward small livestock, such as sheep and goats. A farmer can trade one and a half bags of millet for a young sheep and half to one bag of millet for a young male goat. This means the farmers, who used to allow nomads to graze on their crop residue, now require it for their livestock. Pastoralists are now forced to rely solely on natural grazing lands (Fadul 2006:38). Previously, local governments designated a time after the rainy season when farmlands opened up for communal grazing. But, because of decreased productivity in farming, the farmers either have to use their crop residue for animals, or sell crop residue to other farmers. The nomads are fighting for the return of the talaig, or communal grazing system (Fadul 2006:40). A final aspect to land issues is the air fences, or zareibat al-hawa. They are constructed by farmers for grazing, farm plots, and grass selling. The nomads then break the fences claiming that they are illegal as they are communal village grazing lands. The farmers in turn claim the nomads use all of the grazing lands and leave none for them. This has been extremely detrimental to relations between nomads and farmers (Fadul 2006:41).
The final cause of conflict is water. Baqqara rely on water pumps that are owned by sedentary farmers, which leads to conflicts and the wells become abandoned. When this is constantly repeated, water sources diminish severely. (Huggins 2004:3). In the past religious leaders and tribal leaders settled these conflicts, but now these conflicts are settled by guns (O’Fahey 2006:26).
The environment dictated how these peoples adapted in order to survive, and thus how they formed society, political practices, and became sedentary farmers. The post-colonial government changed the laws such that the original adaptations were abandoned, and thus conflict ensued. Much of the power of the region is derived from the land and its resources. This was managed by the Fur Sultans, but has been largely exploited by the current government.
______________________________________________
Bibliography
Ateya, Eltayeb Hag
2006 Darfur Between Conflict Systems: An Abstract. Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur: Khartoum, December 2004. Conference Proceedings. Switzerland: University for Peace
de Waal, Alexander
1989 Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985. New York: Oxford University Press.
de Waal, Alexander
2005 Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement. African Affairs 104 (415): 181-205.
Fadul, Abduljabbar Abdalla
2006 Natural Resources Management for Sustainable Peace in Darfur. Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur: Khartoum, December 2004. Conference Proceedings. Switzerland: University for Peace
Haaland, Gunnar ed.
1982 Problems of Savannah Development: The Sudan Case. Norway: Department of Social Anthropology University of Bergen.
Huggins, C.
2004 Communal Conflicts in Darfur Region, Western Sudan. Africa Environment Outlook: 1-9. Hertfordshire: Earthprint Limited.
Johnson, Douglas H.
2003 The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Johnson, Douglas H. and David M. Anderson eds.
1988 The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from North African History. Boulder: Westview Press.
Lobban, Kramer, and Fleuhr-Lobban
2002 Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Metz, Helen, ed.
1992 Sudan: A Country Study. Washington: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.
Mohamed, Adam Azzain
2006 Indigenous Institutions and Practices Promoting Peace and/or Mitigating Conflicts: The Case of Southern Darfur of Western Sudan. Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur: Khartoum, December 2004. Conference Proceedings. Switzerland: University for Peace
Mohamed, Yagoub Abdalla
2006 Land tenure, Land Use and Conflicts in Darfur. Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur: Khartoum, December 2004. Conference Proceedings. Switzerland: University for Peace
O’Fahey, R.S.
2006 Conflict In Darfur: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur: Khartoum, December 2004. Conference Proceedings. Switzerland: University for Peace
O’Fahey, R.S. and J. L. Spaulding
1974 Kingdoms of the Sudan. London: Metheun Co. ltd.
Prunier, Gerard
2007 Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Venezuelan Media: Recent Challenges to Democracy and Freedom of Speech

In the same way that the media in Mexico has liberalized relatively recently, thus leading to democracy, the media in Venezuela is experiencing the opposite. Venezuela one had the most respected media in Latin America1, but President Chavez’s recent attack on Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), a popular source for news and entertainment, has brought into the Venezuelan media into question over its freedom of expression. RCTV reached over ninety-five percent of venezuela’s population, which is more that five million household2. Some argue that this is a step towards a dictatorship along the lines of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. RCTV had been broadcasting for 53 years, and its license was up for renewal May 27th, 2007. In December Chavez announced that the license would not be renewed because of RCTVs support of the 2002 coup attempt as well as alleged broadcasting infractions3. This paper will address five concerns that dictate the international and national responses to RCTV. The first is why was Venezuela such a respected media source, as this pertains to the recent degradation of the media. Secondly how does Chavez attempt to control the media in general and how did he execute his plan against RCTV. Fourthly the paper will address how new media outlets, such as the internet. Finally it will address what this media control means for Democracy in Venezuela. This will reveal the extent of this incident as well as sentiments internationally and nationally about this move to limit television broadcasts.
Venezuela had one of the most reputable media systems in Latin America since 1958, when a military dictatorship was ousted in favor of democracy. Historically, Venezuela has been one of the most stable countries in Latin America, with democratically elected Presidents that respect the constitution, and it term limits. Chavez, after being elected in 1998 for the first time, and twice after that. He also beat a referendum to remove him from power. He has changed the constitution so to get rid of term limits and further his power. According to John Dinges, “The crisis conscience is occurring in a media community that is among the most prosperous, best trained and equipped, and --until recently-- most respected in Latin America.”4. Just having the government of Chavez in place has led to journalistic degradation as news stations became political and began to report only anti-Chavez protests. What has ultimately led to the downfall of the country, however, is the control Chavez is beginning to exercise over two of the four independently broadcast networks through coercion, and another one through terminating a broadcasting license5.
Traditionally, Chavez has had his way with making sure that media outlets follow his desired path of news. Of the four major non-government news sources, two have capitulated to government demands and now avoid material that criticizes the government. These two stations, Venevision and Televen, were subject to pressures from Chavez, but did have their licenses renewed when they came up for contestation6. The battle has been uphill for these four media stations; RCTV, Venevision, Televen, and Globovision, since Chavez was elected in 1998. He called them “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.”7 Venevision, owned by billionaire Gustavo Cisneros, was targeted by Chavez, who once again used their need to renew a broadcasting license as a pressure point. Venevision chose to remove material from their broadcast that would challenge the government. 8 Cisneros stated “Enough, we can’t be part of the story or play a role in politics but we have to report the story every day.”9 Chavez has effectively used pressure in the past to coerce stations into providing more favorable coverage of the government, which compromises the integrity of the media institutions, and thus their reputations globally. RCTV is another story.
RCTV ran uninterrupted for 53 years, until its broadcast license came up for renewal on May 27, 2007. Chavez announced in December of 2006 that he would be revoking the license because of several reasons, which all vary from source to source, even within the government. While the station has never officially been sanctioned or charged with any crimes,10 accusations range from political motivations to violations of the law. One government official stated the station was being punished, “...for violations of broadcast regulations, including broadcasting pornographic material. Worse yet, RCTV participated in the April 2002 coup against President Hugo Chavez.”11 The official government White Book cites “inciting rebellion” and “lack of respect for authorities and institutions” along with “breaking the laws protecting minors, engaging in monopolistic practices, and failing to pay taxes,” 12. The station was replaced by Television Venezolana Social, or TVes, a government owned station13. This leaves Globovision as the only privately broadcast station in Venezuela. According to polls, four out of five of Venezuelan citizens disagree with the presidents move in eliminating RCTV14. After the broadcast ended there were many protests, especially by students. This also incited international condemnation from Chile, the United States, the European Union15, the Inter-American Press Association, and the government of El-Salvador16. This is a hard blow to freedom of the press in Venezuela. RCTV managed to come back on satellite and cable providers, but was soon challenged as it was run through an international company, RCTV International. Chavez wants to require RCTV to register as a Venezuelan content producer. If RCTV did not comply the satellite and cable companies would be fined, and thus have to discontinue showing the broadcast17.
One interesting aspect of RCTV’s rebellion from the government was the use of new media. After being forced to discontinue broadcasts in May, the station began to broadcast over their web site, which crashed because of heavy traffic flow. The station then moved to the popular website YouTube to broadcast three hour long news programs entitled “El Observador”. It is expected to reach about 800,000 people, which is significantly less that the five million that were initially reached. One benefit of YouTube has been the discourse that has followed with the comments capability of the website. One commenter stated “To close a means of communication is an inexcusable monstrosity.”18 New technology, in this case, has provided a way to circumvent the censorship of the Chavez regime. Because a large portion of the population has access to internet technology, this type of evasion is possible. Unlike China, Venezuela does not have the sophisticated filter technology, so the internet is an unexplored domain for Venezuelan news stations that are censored by the government.
Finally, if one considers freedom of the press as a litmus test for democracy, Venezuela is headed towards an autocratic regime over a democratic one. Only one station remains independent of the government, Globovision. Globovision’s director Alberto Ravell said, “We are not going to change our editorial line that we are not afraid of the threats from this government.”19 As long as some freedom of the press exists in Venezuela then it is possible to reverse the trend and return to Democracy, but until that point, Venezuela is headed towards a autocratic future. By accessing how free the media is, I have determined that democracy is struggling in Venezuela, although not completely gone.
_________________________________________
1 Dinges, John. "Soul search: in Venezuela, the press struggles to regain its bearings after serving as a tool of the anti-Chavez movement. " Columbia Journalism Review.  44.2 (July-August 2005): 52(7). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 6 Nov. 2007 
.2 Cordoba, Jose de. “Lonely Voice: Venezuelan Cable Station Faces Chavez Showdown; After Loss of LIcense, Feisty RCTV Returned; A Second Crisis Looms”. Wall Street Journal. New Your, N.Y.: July 31, 2007. pg A.1.3 “Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression”. Human Rights Watch. May 22, 2007. accessed October 18, 2007. .
4 Dinges, John. "Soul search: in Venezuela, the press struggles to regain its bearings after serving as a tool of the anti-Chavez movement. " Columbia Journalism Review.  44.2 (July-August 2005): 52(7). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 6 Nov. 2007 
.5 Ibid.6 “Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression”. Human Rights Watch. May 22, 2007. accessed October 18, 2007. .
7 Cordoba, Jose de. “Lonely Voice: Venezuelan Cable Station Faces Chavez Showdown; After Loss of License, Feisty RCTV Returned; A Second Crisis Looms”. Wall Street Journal. New Your, N.Y.: July 31, 2007. pg A.1.8 Ibid., p. 29 Romero, Simon. “Media Mogul Learns to Live with Chavez.” New York Times. New York. N..: July 5, 2007. pg A.7.10 Forero, Juan. “Protests in Venezuela Reinvigorate Opposition; Rallies by Free Press Advocates Deride Chavez Over TV License.” Washington Post Foreign Service. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2007. pg. A.8.
11 Amaral, Desiree Santos. “Venezuela’s Media; (Letter)”. New York Times. New York, N.Y. June 15, 2007. pg. A. 2412 “Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression”. Human Rights Watch. May 22, 2007. accessed October 18, 2007. .13 Kraul, Chris. “End of a broadcast era mourned; Venezuela’s oldest station, a Chavez critic, goes off air.” Chicago Tribune. Chicago, Ill.: May 29, 2007, pg. 9. 14 Forero, Juan. “Protests in Venezuela Reinvigorate Opposition; Rallies by Free Press Advocates Deride Chavez Over TV License.” Washington Post Foreign Service. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2007. pg. A.8.15 Ibid. p. 2. 16 Kraul, Chris. “End of a broadcast era mourned; Venezuela’s oldest station, a Chavez critic, goes off air.” Chicago Tribune. Chicago, Ill.: May 29, 2007, pg. 9.17 Cordoba, Jose de. “Lonely Voice: Venezuelan Cable Station Faces Chavez Showdown; After Loss of License, Feisty RCTV Returned; A Second Crisis Looms”. Wall Street Journal. New Your, N.Y.: July 31, 2007. pg A.1.
18 “Silenced Venezuelan TV station moves to YouTube”. CNN.com. May 31,2007. Accessed November 7, 2007..19 “TV station chief: WE are not afraid of Chavez”. CNN.com. May 29, 2007. Accessed November 7, 2007. .

How Far Should the Right to Freedom Of Speech Be Extended? Case Study: Rwandan Genocide of 1994

Freedom of Speech is believed to be a fundamental right of the United States, as well as many other countries, and ideally something that should be extended to every human in the world. Yet this presents a precarious situation when looked at in the context of genocide. Should it be illegal to incite genocide? According to international law it is, however this has come under fire in the past twenty years as genocide afflicted Rwanda, and the aftermath of trying to prosecute journalists for the hate speech they propagated through their newspapers and radio. This paper will also examine the prospect of jamming the radio and television, and whether this would be a viable option for reducing the impacts of future genocides or mass atrocities. At this point, it has been used successfully in Cambodia, Burundi, and Liberia. The United States as well as other countries debated jamming Rwandan radios during the genocide, but failed to do so because of concerns of limiting free speech. It is crucial to examine what happened in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, how newspapers and radios affected it respectively, the trials of three prominent Rwandan journalists, the reoccurrence of hate radio in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi and their respective government’s response, and finally the implications of jamming radio in order to prevent or limit the effects of genocide.
Since the colonization of Rwanda by the Belgians, the Rwandan population has been separated into two “tribes”, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Assigned by the Belgian colonialists, these ethnic identifications have little to do with actual distinctions, but rather a way to create a hierarchy of ruling Tutsi and subordinate Hutus. When the Belgians left the colony, they left the Tutsi in control. They were oppressive of the Hutu people, who soon revolted and took control for the Hutu population. The tensions came to a head in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda. This was a group formed primarily of Tutsi refugees. These attacks in turn provoked attacks against Tutsi living inside of Rwanda, who had nothing to do with the original attacks . On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Burundian president Cyprien Ntarymira were killed after Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. They were returning from Tanzania, where they had discussed and attempted to continue the Arusha Accords of 1993, which ended the initial civil conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda. Shortly after the plane crash the government was taken over by Hutu extremist military factions, including the Presidential guard, the Rwandan Armed Forces, and militia groups such as the Interhamwe and Impuzamugambi. They began the genocide by killing Tutsi people at roadblocks in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. In approximately 100 days they had killed over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Finally on July 4, 1994, the RPF took over the capital and expelled the genocidal government. It then established the government intended by the Arusha Accords .
Media played a large role in encouraging and spreading the genocide in Rwanda. Although this genocide is most famous for its radio broadcasts, newspapers also played a large role in the spreading of hate messages prior to the start of the conflict in Rwanda. One of the journalists who was later put on trial for inciting genocide, Hassan Ngeze, edited the publication entitled Kangura or Wake It Up! .This publication was financed by the ruling party, the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement and its military . The first issues of this newspaper came out in early 1990, and by late 1990 were blatantly propagating inflammatory remarks against the Tutsi population. It published the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu” which demonized the Tutsi as power hungry and blood thirsty, and said they used weapons such as their “money and Tutsi women”. They went so far as to claim that “Consequently, a Hutu who marries or lives with a Tutsi woman, or who hires her as his secretary or assistant was a traitor.” When an international body denounced this hate speech, Habyarimana defended the right to freedom of expression. Soon magazines followed the publication of Kangura such as Umurava, Ijisho rya rubanda, Ijambo, Umurwanashyaka, L’Echo des mille collines, Medaille Nyitamacibiri and Intera .
The largest and most direct influence was, however, from the radio stations, particularly the Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). This station served to coordinate the actions of the militia, to list names and places of hiding Tutsi, to entice moderate Hutu to join the fight, as well as numerous other incendiary functions. The leader of this station was Ferdinand Nahimana, another journalist put on trial after the genocide. RTLM spread both direct and indirect incitement. They claimed that all Tutsi were in support of the RPF, and that they all should be killed as such . The radio station called the Tutsi “inkotanki”, or cockroaches in Kinyarwandan. One specific example states, “We rejoice friends, The inkotanki have been exterminated!” The radio became popular by playing the latest Congolese music while other stations were still playing old music and by having witty radio shows infiltrated by this hate radio .
After the genocide, three journalists stand trial for their part in inciting genocide. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Ferdinand Nahimana, and Hassan Ngeze are the first journalists to be indicted for crimes against humanity after the trial of Julius Streicher, a Nazi editor, who was sentenced to death during the Nuremburg Trials in 1946 .These men were responsible for the publication of Kangura (Ngeze) and the radio station RTLM. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was responsible for the trials, which took place eight years after the genocide in Tanzania. There is much controversy over the implications for free speech and whether the broadcasts and newspapers could be directly linked to individual murders. While this is the current standard, the radio manuscripts show that the radio stations and newspapers specifically called for the murder of individual Tutsi and moderate Hutu. John Floyd, the defense attorney for Ngeze claims that the implications of this trial could extend much further, severely limiting free speech worldwide . This seems very extreme, as these three men were crucial to the genocide in Rwanda, and certainly not every journalist who says something inflammatory will be prosecuted under this precedent. This argument is null because it assumes that freedom speech will continue to be limited farther from speech that directly causes genocide.
There have been further cases of hate radio targeted toward Tutsi populations in both Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In mid-1994 Radio Rutomorangingo (The Radio that Tells The Truth) was founded in Burundi to serve the same function as in Rwanda. They encouraged Burundian Hutus to “finish once and for all the Tutsi oppressor”. The result varied in Burundi as the President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, and international bodies called for it to be dismantled. There was also a Burundian newspaper analogous to Kangura, only pro-Tutsi, “Le Carrefour des Idees”, which was suspended by the Burundian government in 1996, after Reporteurs Sans Frontiers compelled them to. Their paper included headlines such as “They (Hutus) want to roast us on skewers” and “Does the Hutu have a soul?” One measure that has recently been undertaken by non-governmental organizations is “peace radio” broadcasts. They focus on providing unbiased broadcasting and reuniting families after the genocide in Rwanda. So far this has been very successful in mitigating the effects of hate radio . In 1998 there was also a marked increase in hate radio in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Bunia, a town in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a recent report stated that the Hutu should use “a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones, and the like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis.” The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shut down these broadcasts, although rebels still try intermittently to broadcast them .
In instances such as these, several times jamming the radio or television broadcasts has been suggested. It was successfully done in Burundi, and could have possibly had a large effect on the Rwandan Genocide. The United States, along with several other countries and the United Nations considered jamming the radios in Rwanda, but failed to do so because of worries over freedom of speech. However, this should fall under the Genocide Convention. Now many countries lament not jamming the radio broadcasts in Rwanda, as they were so crucial in the genocide. After 1994, President Clinton of the United States helped to pass a law that would allow the United States to jam any radio broadcasts that were perceived as inciting genocide . Clearly in retrospect this would have been the proper course, although some still maintain that freedom of expression should be held up in every case. There should however, be a limit on freedom of expression when it directly causes the death or murder of another person. At this point one individual’s rights are imposing on another’s right to live. Thus the case of the Rwandan genocide proved crucial in determining the necessity that international law allow countries to jam radio broadcasts that directly incite genocide.
____________________
Des Forges, Allison. Part 1: Hate Media in Rwanda: Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda 1994. Accessed 10/12/2007. .

William Ferroggiaro, ed. The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction. Accessed 10/12/2007. . August 20, 2001.

Temple-Raston, Dina. “Journalism and genocide: a landmark case in Rwanda raises the issue: can words kill? How much press freedom is too much?.” Columbia Journalism Review. 41.3 (Sept.-Oct. 2002): 18(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 .

Li, Linda. "On the air: Rwanda's media challenges.(AFRICA). ." Harvard International Review. 29.2 (Summer 2007): 6(1). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007
.

Schabas, William A. "Hate speech in Rwanda: the road to genocide. " McGill Law Journal. 46.1 (Nov 2000): 141(31). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 p.3
.

Straus, Scott. What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda’s “Radio Machete”. University of Wisconsin, Madison. Accessed 10/12/2007. .

Schabas, William A. "Hate speech in Rwanda: the road to genocide. " McGill Law Journal. 46.1 (Nov 2000): 141(31). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 p. 5
.

Des Forges, Allison. Part 1: Hate Media in Rwanda: Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda 1994. Accessed 10/12/2007. .

Temple-Raston, Dina. “Journalism and genocide: a landmark case in Rwanda raises the issue: can words kill? How much press freedom is too much?.” Columbia Journalism Review. 41.3 (Sept.-Oct. 2002): 18(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 .

Temple-Raston, Dina. “Journalism and genocide: a landmark case in Rwanda raises the issue: can words kill? How much press freedom is too much?.” Columbia Journalism Review. 41.3 (Sept.-Oct. 2002): 18(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 .

Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D, ed. IRIN report on hate media 98.2.26 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa. 26 February 1998. Accessed 10/13/2007. .

HRW Alarmed About Hate Radio Broadcasts and the Incitement of Ethnic Violence in the DRC. Human Rights Watch. 2004. Accessed 10/12/2007. .

Metzl, Jamie F. “Information intervention:when switching channels isn’t enough”. Foreign Affairs. 76.n6 (Nov-Dec 1997):15(6). Academic OneFile. Gale. Middlebury College. Middlebury, VT. 11 Oct. 2007 .

What Should the US do in Iran?

Presently, Iran is continuing with its plan for Nuclear Proliferation. While the Iranian government has made claims that this program is solely for nuclear power purposes, President Ahmadinejad has expressed his opinion that Israel should be “wiped off map”. In either case, Iran is in blatant violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. While Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty (meaning Iran signed in agreement not to control nuclear weapons), has the right to pursue and enact programs for nuclear power for peaceful endeavors, they must submit themselves to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent moving past nuclear energy to weapons. According to Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran cannot deny access to their nuclear plants at Nantanz and Arak. This also means any country providing dual-use material to Iran sans inspection bye the IAEA is in violation of the treaty. To date Russia has supplied most of Iran’s resources, although since the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, Russia has offered to produce energy for Iran in Russia and ceased shipments.
Several international and national entities have begun to take action against Iran, particularly the United Nations and the United States of America. The UN’s most important work has been Resolution 1737 adopted by the Security Council. As enumerated by R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary for Political Affairs on December 23, 2006, Resolution 1737 would accomplish five things; it requires Iran give full disclosure to the IAEA, requires Iran stop oil enrichment efforts, prohibits the sale of dual-use equipment (could be used for both nuclear proliferation and for nuclear power), also prohibits any training or financial services that could allow such actions, and finally requires all countries to freeze the assets of any individual involved in Iranian nuclear proliferation.
The US in particular has been active in responding to Iran. Iran has been subjected to US sanctions for 27 years. The most prominent of US legislation on the topic has been the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which sanctioned everything except oil and caviar. Most House legislation has focused on several things: Sanctions (H.Res. 782: April 26,2006), amendments to sanctions, Democracy in Iran, prevention of Money laundering in Iran (H. Res 6198: September 9, 2006), diplomacy to curtail Iranian nuclear proliferation and Iranian sponsorship of International Terrorism (H. Res 282: March 26, 2006). In the Senate there is also been a movement to extend the sanctions on Iran, as introduced by S. 3971 (September 28, 2006) which would effectively extend sanctions on countries that support Iran.
In September, the Senate committee on Foreign Relations held testimonials to explore the ideas of experts on viable solutions for Iran. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow for Middle East Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations, encourages recognition of Iran as a regional power so they could use their stability to aid the situation in Iraq. Iran is mostly Shiite and has direct ties to Iraq’s Mahdi army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr. They have the power to help quell sectarian violence in Iraq. Takeyh feels that in order to make progress in Nuclear policy, Iran’s ties to Hezbollah and Iraqi violence must also be addresses. Other testimonials, such as those given by Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry suggest more economic and political sanctions on a multilateral front. It is clear to the US government that European participation is crucial to their success in Iran. They also encourage the US and other interested countries to pressure Iran for diplomatic talks.
While there is speculation that President Ahmadinejad is using “brinkmanship” for political gain, Iran has the potential to prove a serious threat to the international community. Since this stems from Nationalism, it is crucial that the international community take steps to eliminate the threat while recognizing Iran’s sovereignty and power. The other reason for increased sanctions is that inflation in Iran is at thirty five percent, unemployment has skyrocketed, and six percent of the population is addicted to heroine. With increased economic and political sanctions, dissent will grow stronger within the Iranian population, which would put additional pressure on the government to coalesce to the international community.